The regulation of telecommunications, railroads, and other network industries has been based on mandatory unbundling and facilities sharing -entrants have the option to lease part or all of incumbents' facilities if and when they desire, at rates determined by regulators. This flexibility is of great value to entrants, but because investments are largely irreversible, it is costly to supply by incumbents. However, pricing formulas used by regulators to set lease rates for capital do not compensate incumbents for this flexibility, so that incumbents are effectively forced to subsidized entrants, discouraging further investments. This paper shows how pricing formulas used to set lease rates can be adjusted to account for the transfer of option value from incumbents to entrants, and estimates the average size of the adjustment for land-based local voice telecommunications in the U.S.
Why is it important that these regulated prices account for the full economic value of the capital? Putting aside issues of equity, the main reason is that a regulatory regime that systematically under-compensates incumbents will discourage future capital investment, which in the long run will harm consumers.
It has been argued that in the case of telecommunications and railroads, this is not a problem because the capital has already been sunk. Indeed, if no new investment were needed to maintain or improve existing communications networks, the disincentives resulting from policies that under-compensate investors might not be of much importance (unless those policies increased the risk of bankruptcy). Owners of existing facilities would suffer economic losses, but consumers would be largely unaffected, because earlier investments in the existing networks cannot be "undone." Telecom networks, however, require ongoing investments just to maintain a given quality of service, and companies have discretion over the timing of those investments and over the extent to which quality is maintained or improved.
7 A related claim is that investment incentives are unimportant because incumbents have a "duty to serve," i.e., they must provide service to any customer requesting it, and therefore must invest accordingly. But the duty to serve is a limited obligation that only applies to basic service, not ancillary services such as call waiting, three-way calling, etc., and does not address all aspects of the quality of service.
Again, companies have discretion over much of their investment.
It has also been argued that regulatory regimes based on mandatory unbundling and the sharing of incumbents' facilities are inherently flawed, and are very unlikely to generate long-run welfare gains for consumers. 8 In the case of the 1996 Telecom Act, mandatory unbundling became a significant reality starting only around 1999, so it is difficult to empirically assess its impact on prices, quality of service, and investment, although a number of studies have tried to do so. 9 This paper is not concerned with that debate, and takes mandatory unbundling as a given.
Regulatory authorities have adopted mandatory unbundling and facilities sharing as a means of generating competition, so even as a second-best policy, it is important to implement it optimally. This means pricing shared capital correctly, and in particular, accounting for the irreversibility of investment and the transfer of option value that it implies.
I address the pricing of unbundled network elements (UNEs) in telecommunications 7 From 1990 to 1995, approximately $20 billion in annual capital expenditures was used just to maintain existing Bell networks, and further investments are necessary to upgrade systems or to deploy new technologies. With demand for data services (including DSL) beginning to drive new capital expenditures starting around 1996, annual investment grew strongly through 2000. By 2002, real ILEC investment had fallen to about where it was in 1990, and investment continued to fall in 2003. As discussed in Pindyck (2004) , substantial expenditures are needed simply to maintain the existing infrastructure. See Hausman and Myers (2002) for a discussion of this point in the context of railroads. 8 See, e.g., Kahn (2004) and Tardiff (1999) , and for empirical evidence, Hausman and Sidak (2005) . 9 Studies that show overall gains from mandatory unbundling include Clarke et. al. (2004) , Willig et al. (2002) , Ford and Pelcovits (2002) and Phoenix Center (2003) . Studies that show reduced investment and thus losses include Jorde, Sidak, and Teece (2000) , Crandall, Ingraham, and Singer (2004) , and Hazlett, Havenner, and Bazelon (2003) . Focusing on the demand side of the market, Economides, Seim, and Viard (2004) estimate the consumer welfare benefits of entry into local markets following the 1996 Telecom Act. Knittel (2004) estimates price impacts, and Greenstein and Mazzeo (2003) show that entrants seem to differentiate their services, and thereby provide variety.
networks, and show how the TELRIC framework can be corrected to account for the transfer of option value from incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to entrants, i.e., competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). The recent policy debate over TELRIC has raised two important questions:
1. How should the transfer of option value be taken into account, i.e., how should TELRIC be adjusted?
2. How significant is this transfer of option value, i.e., as a practical matter is it important to take it into account?
This paper attempts to answer both of these questions. Although I focus on telecommunications, the results developed here can be applied to capital pricing under mandatory unbundling regimes in other industries as well.
In the next section, I lay out a model of investment and pricing that accounts for the fact that part of an incumbent's investment is subject to a "duty to serve," but part is discretionary. I then
show that while there are many ways to "fix" TELRIC, i.e., to adjust prices so that they include option value, the simplest approach from the point of view of implementation is to adjust the cost of capital input used in the current TELRIC formulation. I show that this adjustment can be calculated from a small set of observable market variables, so that its use by federal or state regulatory agencies should be reasonably straightforward. I calibrate the model using data on capital stocks, prices, investment, and other variables for U.S. local exchange carriers, and then estimate the size of the adjustment to the cost of capital needed to correct TELRIC. I find that adjustment to be as high as 4.5 percentage points. For example, an ILEC's roughly 13 percent cost of capital would have to be increased to 17.5 percent when used as an input in TELRIC.
The Model.
I consider two kinds of capital, both of which are industry-specific and long-lived, and thus can be treated as irreversible investments. The first kind is the basic line for residential or business service. The ILEC must invest in this capital to meet demand, and the price of this basic service is regulated. 10 The second kind of capital is used to provide a variety of other services, the prices of which are unregulated. These include ancillary "vertical" services, such as call waiting, three-way calling, voice mail, etc. (I will refer to all of these other unregulated services as "ancillary services.") The ILEC has discretion over the purchase and installation of this capital, i.e., it has the option to install it if and when it wants. The demand for these ancillary services depends on the price, which is unregulated. However, a customer can buy ancillary services only if he or she has a telephone line, i.e., has basic service.
Under the 1996 Telecom Act's mandatory unbundling rules, a CLEC can lease parts of the network (i.e., one or more UNEs) from the ILEC and use them to provide both basic and ancillary services. CLECs typically have little interest in providing basic service alone, because the profit margins on such service are low or zero. Providing a customer with basic service, however, gives the CLEC the ability to sell that customer the ancillary services for which margins are higher. (CLECs usually target their marketing efforts toward potential customers who -based on income or other characteristics -are likely to purchase ancillary services. In fact, often CLECs will only offer potential customers a bundled service that includes the basic line as well as the ancillary services.) Without loss of generality, I consider an ILEC that faces entry by a single CLEC.
I assume that the demands for basic service and ancillary services fluctuate stochastically, so that (for any given price) future demands are uncertain. I also assume that capital -whether copper loops, switches, or central billing facilities -can be measured in "line-equivalents." Thus the provision of basic service to a residential customer requires one line-equivalent of capital, and the provision of ancillary services to that customer requires an additional multiple (in practice less than one) of a line-equivalent of capital. Consistent with the way that depreciation is treated in the TELRIC framework, I also assume that capital lasts for a fixed period of time, T.
Based on an estimate by Vander Weide (2003) , the average lifetime for LEC capital is about 14 years, although this number can vary depending on the specific type of capital.
The quantity of basic service demanded, measured in lines, is given by x t , which evolves stochastically (see below). This service, which the ILEC has a duty to provide, is sold at the regulated price P 1 . The second, higher-margin segment of demand is for ancillary "vertical"
services. The (inverse) demand curve for this segment is linear and is given by: 
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process. Later I discuss how the drift and volatility parameters, a and σ, can be estimated. of providing ancillary services, and that these costs are the same for a CLEC. The cost of capital for both the ILEC and the CLEC is r ρ > , where r is the risk-free interest rate. Thus ρ is the discount rate, adjusted for systematic risk, which the firms use to value future cash flows. In this setting, ρ might be the firm's weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I denote by k the cost of one line-equivalent unit of capital, which I assume is constant.
In eqn. (2) for the demand shift variable, a is the drift rate, i.e., the expected rate of growth of x t . The risk-adjusted expected rate of return associated with x t is ρ, so a δ ρ = − is the "return shortfall" for x t . I assume that a ρ < (otherwise investments would yield infinite returns).
When the CLEC leases capital, it pays the ILEC the TELRIC price for each unit of capital that it leases. The TELRIC price is the amortized cost of the unit, based on the ILEC's cost of capital, ρ. If capital lasted forever, i.e., if there were no depreciation, the TELRIC price would
If capital lasts for T years, the TELRIC price would be:
11 E.g., for a WACC of 13% and an average lifetime of 14 years, A T = .159k. The details of TELRIC pricing are complicated (many individual costs must be estimated for specific network configurations), but the basic idea is straightforward: The ILEC is "reimbursed" for its capital cost through an annual WACC-based annuity payment. TELRIC also includes payment for one-time set-up costs and direct and indirect ongoing fixed costs, which I ignore.
Finally, to simplify the analysis of the firm's investment decisions, I assume that all capacity is utilized as long as marginal revenue from the last unit of capacity is positive. In other words, I
ignore the presence of "operating options" (i.e., options to leave some capacity unutilized if the revenue from that capacity is below variable cost). 12 2.1. ILEC Profit and Investment.
Let us assume for the time being that there is no entry by CLECs. The ILEC's flow of profit from the provision of basic service is then given by:
I assume that the price of basic service is set so that the resulting economic profit is just zero, i.e., . The variable profit from the provision of ancillary services, i.e., the profit ignoring the cost of the capital needed to provide those services, is
Thus the incremental profit from the provision of ancillary services to one more customer is 
Assuming that the incremental unit of capital is always utilized (so that there are no operating options), the value of the unit is the expected present value of this incremental flow of profit over the lifetime of the capital: Now consider the ILEC's decision to invest in this incremental unit of capital. We must find the value of the option to invest in the unit, and the critical value of x that triggers that investment. That critical value, x * (K), is a function of total capacity K, and can be inverted to yield the optimal capacity K * (x). The value of the option to invest in an incremental unit of capacity for the provision of ancillary services, which I denote by 2 ( ; ) F K x ∆ , must satisfy the following differential equation (see Pindyck (1988) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ):
along with the following three boundary conditions:
Using boundary condition (10), the solution to this differential equation is given by:
, and 
There are still two unknowns, the constant B and the critical value x * . They can be found from the remaining two boundary conditions (11) and (12). Substituting eqns. (13) and (8) into those conditions yields the following expression for the critical value x * (K):
This expression can be inverted to give the ILEC's optimal capital stock:
Finally, the solution for B is given by:
Note from eqn. (14) that an increase in the volatility of demand, σ, makes β smaller, so that the optimal capital stock becomes smaller. And note from eqn. (17) that , so that other things equal, the larger is K, the smaller is the value of the option to add one more unit of capital.
Correcting TELRIC.
Now suppose that a CLEC can lease this incremental unit of capital from the ILEC over arbitrarily short periods of time at the annual TELRIC rental rate of A T per unit, with A T given by eqn. (3). To provide ancillary services to the incremental customer, the CLEC must also provide the customer with basic service, so that it will need (1 + γ) line-equivalents of capital, and will incur an annual cost for this capital of (1 T A γ + ) . The ILEC receives this annual payment, so initially it earns zero economic profit. However, should x fall (i.e., market conditions become adverse), the CLEC will stop leasing the capital, and the ILEC will have a negative economic profit. Thus, the ILEC's average return on the capital will be negative, and it will have no incentive to make the investment needed to provide the incremental ancillary service. (I assume that it has no choice with regard to its investment in the capital needed to provide basic service.)
The problem here is that the value of the ILEC's option has been transferred to the CLEC, but the CLEC's rental rate under TELRIC does not account for this. To see this, note that under the optimal exercise rule (and absent the CLEC), the ILEC's net payoff when it invests is
Under this optimal rule, the NPV of the investment is greater than zero because if market conditions deteriorate, the ILEC will hold capital that it would prefer not to have. If it had no option to choose the timing of its investment (or if, like the CLEC, it could freely "uninvest" in the future), ∆F 2 would be zero, and investment would occur at the point where
Under TELRIC, this option is transferred to the CLEC, so the full economic value of the capital that the CLEC is leasing is . To compensate the ILEC for this, we must find an adjusted cost of capital,
Eqn. (19) says that the TELRIC price -the purchase cost of the incremental capital leased to the CLEC (the basic line plus the associated capital for ancillary services) amortized at the adjusted rate C ρ -should equal the cost of the unit plus the value of the option to invest in the ancillary capital, all amortized using the actual cost of capital ρ.
13
If capital did not depreciate, i.e., T = ∞ , eqn. (19) would simplify to:
and the corrected cost of capital would be given by:
For the simplified case of infinitely lived capital, eqn. (21) says that the cost of capital used in TELRIC should be increased by a percentage markup. The markup is equal to the value of the option to install the capital needed to deliver ancillary services to an incremental consumer divided by the cost of both that capital ( ) k γ and the capital needed for the basic line (k). Using an analogy to financial options, the markup is the percentage option premium at the optimal exercise point, with the exercise price scaled up by the cost of the basic line.
Because the value of the option used in the adjustment is determined at the optimal exercise point, we can use boundary condition (11) 
Eqn. (22) can be manipulated to obtain an expression for ∆F 2 that is easier to calibrate.
for K in eqn. (22), and use eqn.
(1) to eliminate Q 2 . Next, let η 2 denote the price elasticity of demand for ancillary services, i.e., 2 2 2 2 / / ( P bQ P bx P 2 )
Thus,
Making the substitutions, we can rewrite eqn. (22) as:
13 Note that I am using eqn. (3) for A T . If the ILEC had no obligation to provide basic service, i.e., it had an option to invest in the basic line, then the premium on basic services capital would be calculated analogously to eqn. (19):
is the value of the option to invest in an incremental basic line.
The adjustment to the cost of capital is found by substituting eqn. (23) variables needed to calculate the adjustment are the annual price, marginal cost, and elasticity of demand for ancillary services, the capital cost of a line, and the fraction of that cost needed for the capital to add ancillary services to one line. In addition, we need the firm's actual cost of capital, ρ, the average lifetime of its capital, T, and the parameter β, which in turn depends on the risk-free rate and the drift and volatility of demand, and is given by eqn. (14).
We have answered the first of the two questions posed in the Introduction: How should TELRIC be adjusted to account for the transfer of option value? To answer the second question -How large is the adjustment? -we must estimate values for the various inputs to the model.
Calibration.
To per year (or about $25 per month).
Because they are not regulated, the FCC does not collect price data on ancillary services.
However, other sources provide data on prices of residential and business local service bundles (which include both basic and ancillary services) and comparable basic service prices, making it possible to infer prices of ancillary service bundles. Also, the FCC reports RBOC revenues received for ancillary services, so that quantities of ancillary service bundles can be determined.
As shown in Appendix A, the average annual price of a comprehensive set of ancillary services was P 2 = $249.99 (about $21 per month). Dividing revenue from ancillary services by this price (see Appendix A), the quantity, measured as the full ancillary services equivalent number of lines, was Q 2 = 51.7 million. We also need an estimate of the price elasticity of demand for ancillary services, η 2 . Testimony before the Illinois Commerce Commission, based on a
proprietary Ameritech study, estimated this elasticity to be about -1.5. 16 In the absence of any other studies, I use this value of -1.5, which seems reasonable. Finally, using P 2 = $249.99 and η 2 = -1.5, along with the monopoly markup formula, the implied marginal cost of providing one unit of full ancillary services is Dividing by x = 142.7 million lines gives k = $1,080. 19 The remaining inputs are the parameters of eqn. (2) for the stochastic process governing the evolution of x. Using data on the growth of RBOC lines, I estimate the drift rate a to be -0.015 on an annual basis. The estimation of σ, the standard deviation of the annual rate of growth of x, is more complex and is discussed below.
Estimating Demand Volatility.
One way to estimate σ, the volatility of demand growth, is to use the same data on RBOC lines that were used to estimate the drift rate a. The value of an RBOC (or, for that matter, any company) can be broken down into the value of its capital in place, and the value of its options to add more capital in the future should demand conditions warrant it. These two components of value (and especially the second component) depend on the level, expected rate of growth, and volatility of demand. Changes in 18 Note that α is the expected future share of CLEC lines. When market conditions are strong (weak) so that CLEC entry is high (low), the actual share of CLEC lines will exceed (be less than) α . value -i.e., equity returns -can thus be related to these characteristics of demand. In Appendix B, I show how the model developed above can be used to obtain a relationship between the volatility of demand and the volatility of (un-levered) RBOC stock returns. For σ = 0.048, the average adjustment is 1.2 percent (i.e., the cost of capital that should be used in TELRIC is about 14.2 percent rather than the actual 13 percent cost of capital). Using eqn. (3), this 1.2 percent adjustment translates into an adjustment in the TELRIC price of UNEs of 6.1 percent. For σ = 0.094, the adjustment is 4.5 percent, i.e., a 17.5 percent cost of capital should be used in TELRIC. Again using eqn. (3), this 4.5 percent adjustment in the cost of capital implies an adjustment in the TELRIC price of UNEs of about 22.9 percent.
Estimating the Adjustment.
20 I excluded Qwest because the deterioration in its finances over the past two years (largely due to the decrease in the value of its long haul fiber-optic network) complicates the calculations required to un-lever its stock returns. We can now answer the second question posed in the Introduction: How large is the adjustment, and as a practical matter, is it important to take it into account? Clearly, the answer depends on what one believes about the volatility of demand for land-based local telephone service. Using the sample standard deviation of the historical growth in lines, the TELRIC price of UNEs would only increase by 6 percent. Applying this percentage increase to the portion of RBOC capital that is used for ancillary services and is leased to CLECs implies a total annual increase in TELRIC related revenue to the RBOCs of α [∆A·K 2 ] = $67.6 million. Although this number is modest, it is still significant. On the other hand, using the volatility based on stock market data, the annual increase in TELRIC related revenue is $255.1 million.
Both of these numbers may underestimate the true burden on ILECs from the transfer of option value to CLECs because I have only applied the adjustment to capital that is used for ancillary services. Because basic service is subject to a duty to serve, one could argue that there is no option value, and thus no transfer of option value from ILECs to CLECs, for much of the associated capital. This would be true if the regulated price of basic service, P 1 , were continually adjusted as demand fluctuated to ensure a competitive return on the associated capital (e.g., a return based on the ILEC's actual WACC). But suppose more realistically that instead the regulated price is fixed for extended periods of time at a level that would provide a competitive return on the ILEC's capital in the absence of CLEC entry. In other words, the price would be set at a sufficiently high level that during times of high demand and full capacity utilization, the ILEC would earn a higher-than-competitive return to compensate for lower returns during periods of low demand. In that situation, CLECs would have an incentive to enter and use the ILEC's capital to provide basic service when demand is high, but not enter (or exit) when demand is low. The CLEC would then earn a higher-than-competitive return on average, while the ILEC earned a lower-than-competitive return. Given the duty to serve, the impact of this forced transfer of profits on ILEC investment and consumer welfare is unclear. However, to eliminate the transfer, regulators would have to expand the capital stock to which the TELRIC adjustment is applied to include capital used to provide basic service. As discussed in the Conclusions, this means that the nature and extent of demand volatility must be an important focus of the regulatory proceedings used to implement TELRIC. As Figure 1 shows, the sensitivity of the adjustment to σ is greater the higher is the growth rate of lines, a.
However, a is relatively easy to estimate, and unless σ is large, the adjustment is not very sensitive to its value. A second parameter that may be difficult to pin down is η 2 , the elasticity of demand for ancillary services. But as Figure 2 shows, unless σ is quite large, the cost of capital adjustment is not very sensitive to this parameter. Table 2 shows the sensitivity of the adjustment to the other variables and parameters of the model, using 0.094 as the value of σ. Note that the adjustment does not depend on the number of basic lines, x, or on the price of basic service, P 1 ; as discussed above, I ignore any option value associated with basic service because of RBOCs' obligation to serve. The adjustment does depend, however, on the price and quantity of ancillary services; increasing either increases the value of the associated incremental investment option. However, these variables and the other parameters of the model can be estimated fairly precisely, and in each case a 10 percent change in the estimate leads to a fairly small change in the calculated adjustment. Thus, in terms of actually applying the model, the greatest challenge remains estimating the volatility σ.
Note: Elasticities calculated holding all other variables constant except as noted: c 1 varies with P 1 so that the zero economic profits condition holds. Elasticities with respect to Q 2 and K 2 are calculated adjusting γ such that γ = K 2 / Q 2 . The elasticity with respect to γ (holding Q 2 fixed) is equal to the elasticity with respect to K 2 . Elasticity with respect to ρ(r) is calculated assuming r is changing such that r = .05 +/-.1 * ρ. Elasticities of P 2 ' and η 2 ' are calculated by adjusting c 2 such that c 2 = [(P 2 * η 2 ) + P 2 ]/ η 2 . -0.9 -1.1 -1.3 -1.5 -1.7 -1.9 -2.1 -2.3 -2.5
Price Elasticity for Ancillary Services, η2
Premium Note: The cost of providing vertical services, c2, is adjusted, via the monopoly markup formula, as η 2 is changed.
Conclusions.
For better or for worse, mandatory unbundling and facilities sharing has become a central part of the regulatory framework that governs telecommunications, and has also been used in other industries. To apply this framework, however, it is essential to correctly determine the lease rates that entrants should pay incumbents for the use of the incumbents' facilities. In the case of telecommunications, the TELRIC formula by which these lease rates are set undercompensates incumbents because it ignores the irreversibility of their capital investments and the corresponding transfer of option value to entrants. This, in turn, creates a disincentive for ongoing investment by incumbents.
Although this problem has been pointed out by others, there has been no consensus as to its importance, or how TELRIC or related pricing formulas can be altered to correct the problem.
The model developed in this paper provides a fairly simple method for correcting TELRIC -an adjustment to the cost of capital used as an input to the TELRIC formula. As I have shown, that adjustment can be calculated from a set of basic market variables. Using aggregate U.S. data for the four RBOCs, I have shown that for the U.S. as a whole, the adjustment is significant, and the current TELRIC formula substantially undercompensates incumbents. The actual size of the adjustment, however, depends critically on the volatility of demand growth.
We have seen that estimating demand volatility is not straightforward, and one can arrive at alternative estimates that are plausible but sufficiently different to lead to quite different cost of capital adjustments. This is typical in models of irreversible investment and the valuation of "real options." One might think that this is a weakness of the approach proposed in this paper, but it is not. On the contrary, it can re-focus the deliberations of regulatory agencies on what really matters, rather than inputs that are of marginal importance in setting prices. In state proceedings, for example, inordinate time and resources have been spent on the question of whether an ILEC's historic average cost of capital is 12.9 versus 13.1 percent. We have seen that the correct cost of capital input for TELRIC should be significantly larger than either of these numbers; at issue is whether it should be larger by about 1 percentage point or 4 to 5 percentage points. The answer depends on the extent of demand volatility looking forward, and that should be the focus of regulatory deliberations.
The cost-of-capital adjustments that I have estimated are based on a calibration using aggregate and average numbers for the U.S., and a calibration for a particular state or region could differ considerably. Capital stocks, CLEC penetration, average line growth, and volatility all differ considerably across different regions of the country, and such differences are one reason that TELRIC rates currently differ so much across regions. However, all of the inputs needed to apply the method proposed here are already available, or could easily be estimated, on a regional basis. Thus the implementation of this method by state regulatory agencies should be fairly straightforward.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that there is a question as to whether the adjustment to TELRIC should be applied only to capital used for ancillary services, or also to some or all of the capital used to provide basic service. Although basic service is subject to a duty to serve (suggesting that there is no transfer of option value from ILECs to CLECs), regulated prices of basic service are not continually adjusted to ensure a competitive return on the associated capital.
This creates an opportunity for CLECs to earn supracompetitive profits by entering or exiting in response to changes in demand, which in turn generates a transfer of option value similar to that for ancillary services. To eliminate the transfer, the capital stock to which the TELRIC adjustment is applied would have to include some or all of the basic services capital.
APPENDIX A -DATA AND MODEL CALIBRATION
This appendix provides additional details on the estimation of the various inputs to the model, including data sources.
Prices and Quantities of Ancillary Services. This estimate is for residential prices. An informal phone survey of the four RBOCs provided information on how their prices of ancillary services for business lines compared to their prices of these services for residential lines. The business prices varied considerably, but on average they were similar to the residential ancillary services prices (see Table A -2 below). I use the more accurately measured annual ancillary services price of $249.99, shown in Table A-1.
We also need the quantity, Q 2 , of the full ancillary services equivalent number of lines for which those services were added. For example, a customer who purchases the full range of these services has one unit of Q 2 , but a customer who purchases only one such service, say voicemail, has a fraction of one unit of Q 2 . Thus Q 2 is estimated by dividing the total revenues that RBOCs receive from offering ancillary services, R 2 , by the average price of a full set of these services. 
APPENDIX B -ESTIMATING DEMAND VOLATILITY FROM STOCK MARKET DATA
This appendix shows how the parameter σ can be estimated indirectly from stock market data. If we had stock market data for a "pure ILEC" and knew the debt-equity ratio for the company, we could estimate the volatility of the equity, and from that determine the volatility of the ILEC's value. Of course, the stock market value for a company like Verizon will reflect more than its ILEC activity. However, ILEC-related revenue is about two-thirds of Verizon's total revenue, and the fraction is similar for the other RBOCs. Thus I use RBOC stock price data as a proxy for the value of a pure ILEC, denoted by V. As discussed in Appendix A, I use unlevered stock returns for a set of three RBOCs to estimate the parameter σ V in the equation:
We want to relate σ V to the parameter σ in eqn. (2). To do this, we must determine the relationship between the value of the ILEC, V, and the demand shift variable x. This is done by breaking V down into two components: (1) the value to the ILEC of its current capital stock K * (x); and (2) the value of the ILEC's options to add more capital in the future, should demand conditions warrant it. Write the value of the ILEC as V = V c + V f . One might ask why there is any value to the ILEC's options to add capital in the future, given the transfer of option value to
CLECs. The reason is that (at least to date) CLECs do not lease all ILEC capital. Typically, only about 15 percent of ILEC capital is expected to be leased by CLECs, so an ILEC still has option value that it retains. In what follows, I will assume that CLECs lease a fraction α of both the ILEC's basic lines and the ILEC's capital devoted to ancillary services.
Value of ILEC's Current Capital Stock. We begin with V c , the value of the ILEC's current capital stock, which we will treat as fixed. The ILEC has three sources of revenue and hence profit from this capital stock: (i) sales of basic service at the exogenously determined price P 1 ; (ii) sales of ancillary services at the endogenously determined price P 2 (Q 2 ); and (iii) leasing revenue from the CLEC for its use of part of the ILEC's capital. To find V c , we determine the profit flow for each of these three components, and then determine the corresponding capitalized value for the total profit flow. I assume throughout that the CLEC utilizes a fraction α of the total capital stock.
(i) Revenue from Basic Service: The price of basic service is an exogenous (regulated) input, and the quantity of sales for the ILEC is (1-α)x, so this component of profit is simply:
1 1
(1 )( ) P c x
(ii) Revenue from Ancillary Services: For this segment, the price is given by .
The total quantity sold to this segment is in turn given by 
We are calculating the value of the ILEC's current capital stock, so the total capital stock K
which is given by eqn. (16), is fixed at its current value, which in turn is based on the current value of x, i.e., x 0 . The ILEC utilizes a fraction (1-α) of the total capital, so its profit is 2 2
(1 )( ) P c Q 
Note that x follows the GBM of eqn. (2). Following the steps in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, page 82) to take the integral, the value is given by:
Note that we must have β > 2 for V f to remain finite, which in turn imposes an upper bound on σ.
(As σ becomes larger, β becomes smaller, approaching 1 in the limit.) 
